ADA Developments in the Great Lakes Region Over 2017-2018 (IL,IN,MI,MN,OH,WI)
Prepared by:
Barry C. Taylor, Vice President of Systemic Litigation and Civil Rights, Equip for Equality
Rachel M. Weisberg, Staff Attorney / Employment Rights Helpline Manager, Equip for Equality
Sydney Penny, Legal Intern, Equip for Equality
Definition of Disability
Fear of Future Disability / Regarded As
EEOC v. Amsted Rail Co., Inc., 280 F.Supp.3d 1141 (S.D. Ill. 2017)
In 2010, Montrell Ingram applied to be a chipper. He was offered the position contingent on passing a medical exam. While his exam was normal, he provided additional medical information indicating that he had corrective surgery to relieve carpal tunnel syndrome in 2006. He was cleared to work with no restrictions in 2007. However, the employer’s on-site medical examiner found him medically disqualified because of the prior surgery. Amsted did not think Ingram currently had an impairment, but did not hire him for fear that he would develop CTS again. The court found for the EEOC, which had brought the case on Ingram’s behalf, on a “regarded as” claim: “the Court finds there is sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find Amsted regarded Ingram as disabled and, in fact, no reasonable jury could find otherwise.” Additionally, the court noted that Amsted’s conduct “smacks of exactly the kind of speculation and stereotyping that the [ADA] was designed to combat.”
Shell v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co., 2018 WL 1156249 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 5, 2018)
Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co. refused to hire plaintiff Ronald Shell based on fear that he would develop conditions like sleep apnea, diabetes, and heart disease due to his obesity. Shell had none of the listed conditions at the time. The court noted that BNSF treated Shell as if he did have conditions because it considered him a “ticking time bomb” and found that “BNSF is acting based upon an anticipated worst case scenario derived from precisely the sort of myth, fear, or stereotype which the ADA is meant to guard against.”
Reasonable Accommodations
Telework as a Reasonable Accommodation
Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division, 883 F.3d 595 (6th Cir. 2018)
Plaintiff Andrea Mosby-Meachem, in-house attorney at Memphis Light, Gas & Water Division requested to telework for 10 weeks due to pregnancy-related complications. She participated in a phone meeting where she was asked if she could perform each essential function of her job remotely, to which she answered “yes.” However, her request was denied because MLG&WD found that her physical presence was an essential function of her position, and because telework created concerns about confidentiality. The United States District Court for the Western District of Tennessee, Western Division, denied MLG&WD’s motion for summary judgment, and the jury returned a verdict for Mosby-Meachem on her claim of disability discrimination and awarded her $92,000.00 in compensatory damages. The 6th Circuit upheld the jury verdict. In doing so, the 6th Circuit distinguished EEOC v. Ford Motor Co. (en banc), which held that that regular, in-person attendance is essential to most jobs. The court noted that “we expressly did not preclude teleworking in all cases.” In this case, there was evidence Mosby-Meachem worked remotely successfully in the past, and that her request was for a limited period. Here, there was sufficient evidence to support the jury verdict (such as testimony from her colleagues who said it wouldn’t be a problem, and her past experience in which she had never tried a case or taken a deposition) despite evidence to the contrary (such as her job description and the testimony of two former attorneys).
Leave as a Reasonable Accommodation
Severson v. Heartland Woodcraft, Inc., 872 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 2017)
After a 12-week FMLA leave for serious back pain, Raymond Severson requested a leave extension under the ADA for 2-3 months from his employer, Heartland Woodcraft, Inc. His request was denied, but he was invited to re-apply after being cleared to work. Instead of reapplying, Severson sued his employer for discrimination in violation of the ADA because they failed to accommodate his physical disability. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin found for Heartland on their motion for summary judgment and agreed that Severson’s proposed accommodations were not reasonable. The 7th Circuit affirmed, stating, “An employee who needs long-term medical leave cannot work and thus is not a ‘qualified individual’ under the ADA.” The 7th Circuit clarified that intermittent or short leave, such as a couple of days or even a couple of weeks, may be a reasonable accommodation. However, a medical leave spanning multiple months does not permit the employee to perform the essential functions of his job. See also Golden v. Indianapolis Housing Agency, 698 Fed.Appx. 835 (7th Cir. 2017) (six month leave unreasonable under ADA).
EEOC v. S&C Electric Co., 2018 WL 1726429 (N.D. Ill. April 10, 2018)
Richard Rascher had a 12-month disability leave per the policies of his then-employer, S&C Electric Co. His medical provider gave their full authorization for him to work with no restrictions towards the end of his leave. However, S&C Electric Co. suggested he retire. Rascher declined to retire, and was fired. The court denied S&C Electric Co.’s motion to dismiss, and in doing so distinguished Severson. The court found that S&C Electric Co.’s argument that the employee had no ADA protections because he had been on medical leave for 12 months was “nonsense.” Rascher was ready, willing and able to return when fired.
EEOC v. United Postal Service 09-cv-5291 (N.D. Ill. Agreement Reached Aug. 8, 2017)
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/8-8-17.cfm
Per UPS “inflexible leave policy”, employees with disabilities are automatically fired when they reached 12 months of leave. The EEOC argued that this policy was a violation of ADA for failure to engage in interactive processes. The parties reached a settlement where UPS agreed to pay $2 million to nearly 90 current and former UPS employees. UPS also agreed to update their reasonable accommodation policies and improve implementation and training.
EEOC v. Macy's, Inc/Macy's Retail Holdings, Inc. 17-cv-05959 (N.D. Ill. Agreement Reached Apr. 18, 2018)
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/4-18-18a.cfm
Macy’s will pay $75,000 to a former employee after terminating her after she missed one day of work due to a medical emergency related to her asthma. The employee, who had worked at Macy’s for nearly eight years, needed immediate medical attention for her asthma. She called in to explain that she was going to the hospital, and the following day provided documentation from the hospital. However, Macy’s denied her request to excuse the absence.
EEOC v. Greektown Casino LLC 2:16-cv-13540 (E.D. Mich. Consent Decree, Jan. 24, 2018)
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/1-24-18a.cfm
Greektown Casino will pay $140,000 to a former employee after refusing to grant extended leave and firing the employee who requested leave in connection with his stress-anxiety disorder. Prior to the consent decree, the EEOC filed suit for failure to provide reasonable accommodations to the employee under the ADA. The employee requested an additional four weeks of extended leave following a stress-anxiety-related collapse on the job. Greektown denied the request and subsequently fired the employee after his FMLA leave was exhausted.
Rotating Shifts as a Reasonable Accommodation
Gradek v. Horseshoe Cincinnati Management, 2017 WL 2573256 (S.D. Ohio June 14, 2017)
Elizabeth Gradek, table games supervisor (TGS) at the Horseshoe Cincinnati Casino had a standing restriction due to a knee injury. Supervisors typically rotate among different casino games, but the craps games have a standing “floor person” and a sitting “box” person. Gradek requested permanent placement in sitting “box” position. Horseshoe would not make the accommodation permanent, but offered her another position as a casino accounting clerk. Gradek refused the position, and her employment was terminated. Gradek sued for failure to accommodate and disability discrimination. Horseshoe filed for summary judgment on all claims, and the court denied the motion. The court found that sufficient factual dispute existed as to whether rotating shifts were an essential function of the TGS position. The court found that the written TGS job description did not conclusively establish that standing for more than one hour at a time was an essential function of the TGS position. The court noted that others had been informally accommodated. The court also found that at minimum, a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the reasonable accommodation poses an undue burden upon Horseshoe, rejecting horseshoe’s argument that the accommodation was an undue hardship because it would prevented others from maintaining skills as there were multiple craps tables open during shift.
Medical Examinations
EEOC v. Strataforce, 1:17-cv-4104 (S.D. Ind. Consent Decree, Nov. 13, 2017)
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/11-14-17.cfm
The EEOC challenged Strataforce’s requirement that applicants for employment complete a pre-offer health questionnaire. The questionnaire asked for sensitive health information, and included numerous disability-related questions. The parties reached agreement and filed a joint motion to approve a consent judgment. Under the consent judgment, Strataforce will be required to provide notice to applicants of their rights under the ADA and submit annual compliance reports to the Commission during the Judgment's four-year term.
DOJ Agreement with New Albany, Indiana, 17-cv-185 (S.D. Ind. Agreement reached Oct 4, 2017)
www.ada.gov/new_albany/new_albany_sa.html
The police chief of New Albany, Indiana requested medical information from an officer on leave. Based on that medical information, the chief filed charges against the officer to the Merit Commission, and in doing so provided medical information. The Commission voted to permit the officer to work at a public meeting. However, at the meeting the chief and the City’s attorney referenced the officer’s disability and their concerns regarding his fitness. The Commission attorney also gave the press charging documents that had info regarding the officer’s prescription medications, treatment, and psychological evaluations. The DOJ and the city of New Albany reached a settlement agreement of $100,000. Additionally, the settlement agreement requires the New Albany Police Department and Merit Commission to revise policies, practices and procedures regarding confidentiality, and provide training about confidentiality requirements.
Disability Harassment
Mashni v. Bd. of Ed., 2017 WL 3838039 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 1, 2017)
Anthony Mashni is an employee of the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, which operates the Chicago public-school system. He worked as a Technology Coordinator at the Norman A. Bridge School (which is a Chicago public school), where he claims that his coworkers, including the principal and assistant principal, mocked, insulted, and harassed him because of his generalized anxiety disorder. Mashni brought suit against his employer for discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act. The court found that the defendant employer, the Board of Education of the City of Chicago, was not entitled to summary judgment on the issue of the hostile work environment claim under the ADA. Mashni’s coworker’s conduct, including 24+ comments mocking his anxiety disability in the presence of others, could be objectively hostile.
Direct Threat
Stragapede v. City of Evanston, 865 F.3d 861 (7th Cir. 2017)
Biagio Stragapede, an employee of the City of Evanston’s water services department, acquired a traumatic brain injury and took leave. Stragapede was examined for fitness for duty by the city’s neurologist, who noted he had “mild residual cognitive deficits” but cleared his return to work. The City asserts that shortly thereafter, Stragapede had performance issues, such as problems changing water meter, logging into his computer, reporting to wrong locations, and driving through an intersection while looking down. The City reported their concerns to the neurologist, who concluded that these events were likely caused by Stragapede’s brain injury. The neurologist drafted a letter saying Stragapede was a direct threat and could not safely perform the essential functions of his job. The City of Evanston fired Stragapede, who then filed an ADA lawsuit. At trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, the jury found for Stragapede and awarded him over $575,000. The City appealed and argued that it honestly believed that Stragapede posed a direct threat to himself and others, so it should not be liable.
The 7th Circuit found for Stragapede and affirmed the lower court’s decision. The court noted that the direct threat defense requires “medical or other objective evidence,” but the City’s subjective belief about Stragapede’s risk was insufficient. The court found that the jury could have rationally found the doctor’s opinion to be unreasonable, because the doctor only had one-sided information and months before had cleared Stragapede’s return. Additionally, Stragapede was able to explain some issues, and other issues named by the City weren’t safety issues.
McLane v. School City of Mishawaka , 2017 WL 430843 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2017)
A groundskeeper, Charles McLane, was observed by employer, School City of Mishawaka, as unable to do essential functions of his job. Those functions included lifting, walking, and bending. School City had a physical therapist conduct a job site analysis of McLane. That analysis concluded McLane was at risk of back injury, so School City transferred McLane to a hall monitor position. McLane subsequently filed a lawsuit under the ADA. On School City’s Motion for Summary Judgment, the court found for School City, as McLane posed a direct threat to himself in light of risk related to improper lifting mechanics.
Ministerial Exception
Entine v. Lissner, 2017 WL 5507619 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 17, 2017)
Ohio State University student, Madeleine Entine, brought a case against OSU's ADA Coordinator in his official capacity, for violations of the ADA. Entine has mental health disabilities, and trained her dog, Cory, to disrupt her panic attacks. When she moved to her sorority house in her second year of school, her request to have Cory live in her sorority house was granted. After a few weeks, another sorority member (Goldman) objected to Cory’s presence, alleging that Cory triggered her allergies and exacerbated her Crohn’s disease. The OSU ADA Coordinator, met with both students to explore their options. He said both students had disability-related needs that were at odds, and decided first person who secured lease could stay. The other person had to move out, or stay without accommodation for their disability. As Goldman secured her lease first, Entine was told to leave, or remain without Cory the service dog. The court granted Entine a temporary restraining order (TRO), and her Motion for Preliminary Injunction. The court addressed the question as to whether the issue was that of competing accommodations, or whether this was a typical service animal case.
The court noted that the ADA requires OSU to modify policy to permit service animals, with narrow exceptions “(1) if the animal's presence would fundamentally alter the nature of the University's services, programs, or activities; (2) if the animal would pose a direct threat to the health or safety of others; or (3) if the animal was out of control or not housebroken.” Here, the court concluded that OSU had failed to conduct a true direct threat inquiry. There was no medical evidence that Goldman’s exacerbations were due to Cory: her blood work showed the presence of other allergens commonly found in campus housing, and her family-owned dog was apparently not a problem. OSU also failed to “thoroughly explore” alternatives to removing Cory, especially because Goldman’s documentation did not suggest that she could not live there under any circumstances. The court also seemed to question Goldman’s credibility.
Website Access
Hindel v. Husted, 2017 WL 432839 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 1, 2017)
The individual Plaintiffs, Shelbi Hindel, Barbara Pierce, and Marianne Denning initiated this case seeking to vote absentee with the assistance of software that would allow them to mark their absentee ballots electronically and to use the software to access the Ohio Secretary of State's website. They claimed that Ohio’s voter services website, which includes information about voting procedures/policies, candidates, new voting initiatives, election results, etc., was inaccessible. On May 11, 2016, the court granted Defendant’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings regarding Ohio Secretary of State's ability to immediately implement an available and accessible absentee voting system for blind voters. However, the court subsequently granted in part the permanent injunction to plaintiffs and ordered defendant to make website compliant with WCAG 2.0 AA. The court found that plaintiffs proved success on the merits of their ADA claim, demonstrated sufficient irreparable injury if they are denied access to the website, demonstrated that an injunction is the only relief that will remedy plaintiff’s injury, and that the balance of hardships weighs in favor of granting an injunction.
Criminal Justice
Communities United et al v. City of Chicago, 17-cv-7151 (N.D. Illinois, Complaint Filed Oct. 4, 2017)
https://www.equipforequality.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/001-Complaint-with-exhibits.pdf
The complaint alleges that the Chicago Police Department habitually uses unnecessary force, that Black and Latino Chicagoans are disproportionately victims of unnecessary force, and that this brutality is magnified for people with disabilities, who are more likely to interact with and experience violence from police. The complaint alleges additionally that Black and Latino people with disabilities face the combined threat of the above factors. Parties are negotiating a consent decree.
Cook v. Illinois Dept. of Corrections, 2018 WL 294515 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 4, 2018)
Plaintiff Dwayne Cook was ordered to participate in substance abuse program while incarcerated. However, only two accessible Illinois Department of Corrections facilities offered such drug treatment programs. Plaintiff’s transfers to facilities that offered the program were twice cancelled due to inaccessible facilities. Eventually, plaintiff was transferred and participated in a program for four months before released. Such programs are typically longer than that. The court found for plaintiff and denied IDOC’s motion for summary judgment. They rejected the argument that IDOC accommodated plaintiff because he participated in and graduated from program, as prison services must be provided on “same basis.” Here, program was substantially shorter and less comprehensive when compared to non-disabled inmates. The case has settled.
McBride v. Michigan Dep’t of Corrections, 2018 WL 1224783 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 9, 2018)
This class action on behalf of deaf and hard of hearing people incarcerated in the Michigan Department of Corrections asserted systemic failure to provide auxiliary aids and services. The court found for plaintiffs, and granted in part their motion for summary judgment. The court found that the MDOC violated the ADA by failing to provide video phones. While MDOC asserted a defense of “possible safety concerns,” they failed to explain why traditional safety policies were insufficient. The court noted that deaf and hard of hearing prisoners must have communications that “are as effective” as communications with others, and noted that defendants’ own witness compared TTY system to “sending someone a fax to their homes versus an email to communicate.” The court ordered that video phones be made available for all deaf/hard of hearing prisoners. The court also found that the MDOC violated the ADA by failing to provide ASL interpreters. The court ordered that MDOC provide necessary auxiliary aids for all deaf and hard of hearing prisoners to participate equally in programs, including consistent access to ASL interpreters for all “high-stakes” interactions, including religious services (even though they are “voluntary” and led by volunteers). The court also ordered mandatory training for correctional officers and staff on how to identify and appropriately interact with deaf and hard of hearing inmates. Since the court granted plaintiffs’ MSJ in part, litigation on other issues is moving forward. (After the lawsuit, there have been some advancements, but problems persist. There is a real risk that ADA violations will continue without court order.)
Sovereign Immunity
King v. Marion Circuit Court, 868 F.3d 589 (7th Cir. 2017)
Marion County subsidizes a private dispute resolution program in domestic-relations cases, the Marion County Domestic Relations Alternative Dispute Resolution Plan. Financial assistance to defray the cost of mediation, the “modest means program,” can be ordered or requested. Plaintiff Dustin King requested the court refer his case to mediation and authorize his participation in the subsidy program. King also asked for ASL interpreter for the mediation. The court denied King’s request for an ASL interpreter for his participation in the program, but agreed to provide one if King continued through court. King declined, and relied on his stepfather to interpret through the mediation process. King sued the circuit court in federal court for denial of benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Indiana asserted sovereign immunity. United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division, held that Indiana does not enjoy sovereign immunity because this case falls within the abrogation of that immunity sustained in Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004). King prevailed at trial, and the Marion Circuit Court appealed. The 7th Circuit found for Marion County and reversed/remanded the bench trial decision. Because sovereign immunity bears on whether a federal court may hear a case, the 7th Circuit addressed the issue before considering the merits. The court found that this was not a valid abrogation of sovereign immunity, and that Marion Circuit Court is immune from this suit in federal court. Here, unlike in Tennessee v. Lane, denial of court-annexed mediation services is not a denial of judicial services. Mediation services were not mandatory for King, but optional. The Circuit Court therefore did not actually violate any right falling under Lane's “fundamental access” umbrella. Therefore, the 7th Circuit concluded that this case has no constitutional dimension, and Title II does not abrogate sovereign immunity here. The Marion Circuit Court remains immune from this suit in federal court.
Absentee Voting
Hindel v. Husted, 875 F.3d 344 (6th Cir. 2017)
Plaintiffs claim Ohio's paper-ballot absentee voter system discriminates against the blind, as blind voters must rely on the aid of a sighted person in order to read and complete the paper ballot, thus depriving them of the ability to vote anonymously. Plaintiffs proposed that Ohio adopt an online marking tool for absentee ballots that is used by other states. Ohio argued fundamental alteration: Implementing a new system would violate state law due to Ohio’s certification requirements. The district court found for Ohio and granted Ohio’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court held that plaintiffs’ allegation that they were denied meaningful access to vote privately and independently was a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA, but the proposed tool was a fundamental alteration to Ohio's voting laws. On appeal, the 6th Circuit found for plaintiffs and reversed and remanded. The 6th Circuit found that Ohio has the burden to show the proposed tool is unreasonable or incompatible with Ohio’s election system. Presently, Ohio will implement a certified electronic ballot marking tool for the November 2018 election. Plaintiffs will be monitoring the implementation.
Zoning Discrimination
Valencia v. City of Springfield, 883 F.3d 959 (7th Cir. 2018)
The City of Springfield, Illinois defines a “family care residence” (CILAs) as a home occupied by a group of no more than six unrelated persons with disabilities, plus paid professional support. City zoning codes restrict “family care residences” from being located within 600 feet of another such facility. Plaintiff Individual Advocacy Group, Inc. (“IAG”), a non-profit organization that provides residential services to adults with disabilities, worked with clients to lease property from landlord for use as a CILA, called the Noble home. A couple years after opening, a complaint was filed against IAG as another CILA was located within 600 feet. In response, IAG tried various methods of approval and exception, which were all denied by the City. In response, IAG and a resident of Noble home filed lawsuit under the ADA, the Fair Housing Act and the Rehabilitation Act, alleging that the City discriminated against the CILA’s residents on the basis of their disabilities. The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois found for plaintiffs and granted their preliminary injunction to enjoin the City from evicting the CILA residents during the pendency of the case. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction was based on their theories of disparate treatment and reasonable accommodation, and the district court found that they possessed a reasonable likelihood of success under both theories of liability.
The 7th Circuit found for plaintiff and affirmed the district court’s decision. The court analyzed the issue under the reasonable accommodation theory: Here, suitable group homes are in short supply, so exceptions are necessary for equal opportunity. “In the context of a zoning waiver, equal opportunity means the opportunity to choose to live in a residential neighborhood.” The City argued that this was not an equal opportunity issue, as “there is no provision under [the City's] zoning code for three unrelated non-disabled adults to live in a single family home.” Therefore, the City argued, plaintiffs “are seeking an opportunity which would not be afforded to similarly situated non-disabled persons under any circumstances.” However, the court found this theory “dubious,” as the City had no record of enforcing the prohibition against three unrelated, non-disabled adults living in the same home. Additionally, the court found that the benefits of this CILA outweighed the potential costs. The City presented no evidence of excess calls to police or emergency services, an alderman admitted that there had been “no issues” because of the CILA placement, and the court noted that because IAG never requested City services, “[i]t would cost the City no money to allow A.D. and the other residents to remain in the Noble home.”
Architectural Access: Barrier Removal
Thomas v. Kohl’s Corp., 2018 WL 704691 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 5, 2018)
Plaintiff Patricia Thomas lives with the progressive effects of Multiple Sclerosis that limits her ability to walk and stand. She uses a walker or scooter. Thomas brought a lawsuit against Kohl’s alleging she could not access certain merchandise due to a narrow path caused by obstruction from a moveable display. The district court found for Thomas and denied Kohl’s motion for summary judgment. Kohl’s had argued that the ADA did not apply because there are no express spacing requirements for moveable display racks. However, the court found that spacing of moveable display racks are governed by the “readily achievable” standard of the ADA. The court noted evidence that those changes would be readily achievable; additional inches around displays would not result in a significant loss of selling or serving space, and enhancing training would have minimal impact on overall operations and resources of store. The court also rejected Kohl’s “customer service defense” as an alternative.
DOJ Agreement with Fill Building Associates, LLC (DJ # 202-37-249) (E.D. Mich. Agreement Reached May 5, 2017)
https://www.ada.gov/fill_building_sa.html
Complainants alleged that the Michigan Institute for Neurological Disorders, located in the Fill Building (“FBE”) in Madison Heights, Michigan, was inaccessible to patients with mobility disabilities due to the building’s non-compliant outer doors and steep ramp slopes. The United States Attorney's Office for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that barriers to accessibility existed, and that those barriers violated the ADA. FBE agreed to resolve these violations within a year by creating van-accessible parking and other accessible parking spots, posting signs indicating accessible entrances and bathrooms, making exterior routes accessible, replacing door hardware on the first, second, and third floors, and making bathrooms, elevators, and counters compliant with ADA standards.
Access to Healthcare
DOJ Agreement with Aurora Health Care (DJ# 202-85-105) (E.D. Wis. Agreement Reached July 21, 2017)
https://www.ada.gov/aurora_hc_sa.html
Two complaints were filed with the United States Department of Justice, alleging that Aurora Health Care, Inc. in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, refused the complainants medical treatment because they have the human immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”). One complainant was denied a hip replacement surgery when his orthopedic surgeon learned of his HIV status. The other complainant’s urologist refused to remove his catheter when the urologist learned of his HIV status. Both complainants eventually had the procedures elsewhere. Aurora Health Care agreed to changes in their training on title III and ADA compliance, and disability discrimination generally; to report future title III complaints to counsel for the United States; to pay the first complainant $30,000 and the spouse of the (now deceased) second complainant $15,000; and to pay $15,000 in civil penalties to the United States.
Access to Medication in Childcare Setting
DOJ Agreement with Learning Care Group, Inc. (E.D. Mich. Agreement Reached Mar. 20, 2018)
https://www.ada.gov/lcg_sa.html
Learning Care Group, Inc., (LCG) located in Michigan, owns and operates approximately 900 child care centers across the country for children ages six weeks to twelve years old. The United States initiated a compliance review of LCG’s treatment of children with diabetes based on complaints from parents of children with Type I diabetes. The parents alleged that LCG refused to assist their children with insulin administration (by pen or syringe). The United States found that this refusal was based on a corporate-wide policy requiring such refusal. LCG agreed to evaluate each request for assistance on an individual basis, and to provide child-specific training to appropriate employees on blood sugar testing; administration of insulin though pen, syringe, or pump; administration of the emergency medication Glucagon; and a refresher on practicing universal precautions. LCG also agreed to update their written policies and procedures regarding LCG’s obligations under title III of the ADA, provide ADA training to their managers, and pay $10,000 in compensatory damages to each of the eight aggrieved individuals/families identified by the United States in its investigation.
Access to Auxiliary Aids
DOJ Agreement with Atlantis Events, LLC (C.D. Cal. Agreement Reached Feb. 20, 2018)
https://www.ada.gov/atlantis_events_sa.html
Atlantis owns and operates a cruise and resort vacation company with its corporate offices located in West Hollywood, California. Atlantis also owns and operates RSVP Vacations in Minneapolis, Minnesota. The complainants allege that Atlantis failed to provide them with appropriate auxiliary aids and services when they requested that sign language interpreters be provided during a round-trip cruise from Los Angeles to Mexico, that Atlantis did not have an accessibility policy for individuals with disabilities, and that Atlantis posted on its website, “American Sign Language Interpreter will not be provided.” Atlantis agreed to adopt and implement and ADA accessibility policy, appoint a Corporate ADA Contact Person, have an ADA Liaison on every cruise, and implement an ADA Grievance Procedure process. Atlantis agreed to not discriminate against people with disabilities in compliance with the ADA. Atlantis also agreed to pay $9,000 in compensation (to be divided between the three complainants) and pay $10,000 in civil penalties to the United States.